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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                                                           
   v.
ANTHONY WATSON,
                                                              Appellant.
___________
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 00-cr-313-5)
District Judge:  Honorable J. Curtis Joyner
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
September 11, 2008
Before: SLOVITER, FUENTES, and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: September 25, 2008)
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We1
have jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2
FUENTES, Circuit Judge:
Anthony Watson appeals from his 360-month post-Booker resentencing following
his jury conviction for conspiracy to distribute cocaine base (“crack”) in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 846; possession with intent to distribute crack in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1); and distribution of and possession with the intent to distribute crack within
1,000 feet of a school in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 860.  Watson argues that his sentence
was based on improper judicial fact finding and constituted an unconstitutional
application of ex post facto law.  He also argues that the District Court erred by failing to
consider letters he submitted prior to his sentencing, as well as legal authorities he has
laid out in a pro-se brief.  For the reasons stated below, we will affirm.1
I. 
Because we write exclusively for the parties, we only discuss the facts and
proceedings to the extent necessary for the resolution of this case.  This is the second
time that we review Watson’s sentence.  His first sentence, issued on June 21, 2001, was
calculated using the former United States Sentencing Guidelines, and resulted in a term
of life imprisonment.  Watson appealed this sentence, challenging the District Court’s
calculation of the relevant sentencing guidelines, the admission of various Government
exhibits, and the denial of his suppression motion.  United States v. Watson, 93 Fed.
3Appx. 481, 482-83 (3d Cir. 2004).  We found Watson’s claims to be without merit, and
affirmed his conviction.  
On January 24, 2005, the Supreme Court vacated Watson’s judgment, and
remanded the case to this Court for further consideration in light of United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  Upon remand, we, in turn, remanded the case to the
District Court for resentencing in light of Booker.  
On October 12, 2006, the District Court resentenced Watson, making findings
identical to those made at the original sentencing, with one exception:  the District Court
enhanced Watson’s sentence by two levels, rather than three, in order to reflect his lesser
role in the offense relative to a previously sentenced co-defendant.  Although Watson’s
total offense level dropped by one level, the guideline range again called for life
imprisonment.  Rather than impose life imprisonment – as it had in the previous
sentencing – the District Court imposed a sentence of 360 months, with eight years of
supervised release, and a fine of $2,500.  The present appeal is from this sentence. 
II.  
Watson first argues that his 360-month sentence violated his Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights to have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, all the facts
essential to his punishment.  In particular, Watson objects that his sentence was based, in
part, on the District Court’s determination that Watson was a street level manager; that
the conduct occurred within 1,000 feet of a school; and that weapons were involved in
Watson also argues that the District Court, and not the jury, determined that he2
was responsible for 1.5 kilograms of cocaine.  Watson is mistaken – this particular
finding was made by the jury.  (Def.’s App. 212-13.) 
4
the offense.   2
In United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 561 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc), decided
after Booker, we held that “[o]nce an individual has been convicted by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt of the predicate facts of illegal conduct, triggering a statutory maximum
penalty, a court may impose any sentence on the individual up to that maximum.”  Id. at
562.  We also reaffirmed that a district court could determine facts by a preponderance of
the evidence, without offending the Fifth or Sixth Amendments, in order to impose a
sentence within the permissible range.  Id. at 568.  Finally, we held that “facts relevant to
application of the Guidelines – whether or not they constitute a ‘separate offense’ – . . .
do not implicate the rights to a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at
567-68.  
Here, although the findings of fact made by the district judge informed his final
decision, they did not increase the maximum amount of punishment to which Watson
was exposed.  Accordingly, the Court acted lawfully in making these factual
determinations.
Watson also argues that the application of the remedial holding of Booker to cases
pending on direct review violates the Ex Post Facto principle of the Due Process Clause. 
We have already addressed this argument in United States v. Pennavaria, 445 F.3d 720
In his supplemental brief, Watson argues that the penalty provisions of 21 U.S.C.3
§ 846 are facially unconstitutional in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466
(2000). 
5
(3d Cir. 2006).  In Pennavaria, we noted that the Supreme Court clearly instructed that its
holding in Booker should be applied to all cases on direct review.  Id. at 723.
Furthermore, we noted that because defendants like Watson had fair warning of the
statutory maximum punishments of their respective crimes, enhancements in punishment
that did not exceed the statutory maximum, even if based on judge-found facts, would
not violate the Due Process Clause.  Id. at 723-24.  Accordingly, the application of
Booker to Watson’s sentence did not violate his constitutional rights. 
III.
Watson also argues that the District Court erred in ignoring various legal
precedents Watson presents in a supplemental pro se brief.   Pursuant to Local Appellate3
Rule 31.3, parties represented by counsel may not submit pro se briefs except in
situations covered by Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).  United States v. Essig,
10 F.3d 968, 973 (1993).  Because Plaintiff was represented by counsel, we need not
address Plaintiff’s arguments.  Nonetheless, we have thoroughly considered Watson’s
arguments, and find them to lack merit.  See United States v. Kelly, 272 F.3d 622, 624
(3d Cir. 2001).
IV.
Finally, Watson argues that the district judge failed to consider “information
6submitted by appellant” in assessing the criteria of 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). Watson claims that
material he supplied to the probation department was not included in the pre-sentence
report, but does not mention with any specificity what material was excluded. 
We review sentences for reasonableness, applying the factors set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a).  See Booker, 543 U.S. at 261-62.  A sentence is reasonable if the
record demonstrates that the sentencing court gave rational and meaningful consideration
to these factors.  United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329 (3rd Cir. 2006).
 The record in this case shows that the District Court carefully considered the
relevant factors set forth in § 3553(a), including the applicable Guidelines range; the
nature, circumstances, and seriousness of the offense; the need to promote respect for the
law; and the interests of deterrence.  (Gov’t App. 27-29.)  Although Watson does not
state what additional documents the District Court failed to consider, the record indicates
that the district judge made his decision to lower Watson’s sentence on appeal based, in
part, on Watson’s progress and development – a finding which strongly suggests that the
district judge reviewed the documents submitted to the Court by Watson and his attorney. 
(Id. (noting that the district judge found that Watson’s improvement as a person rendered
the previous sentence – life imprisonment – “more than necessary to adequately meet the
criteria that are set forth in Section 3553(a)”).)  Accordingly, because the District Court
gave meaningful consideration to the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),
as well as the additional information submitted to the Court, we find that the sentence
imposed was reasonable.
